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Abstract—Identity resolution capability for social networking
profiles is important for a range of purposes, from open-source
intelligence applications to forming semantic web connections.
Yet replication of research in this area is hampered by the lack
of access to ground-truth data linking the identities of profiles
from different networks. Almost all data sources previously used
by researchers are no longer available, and historic datasets are
both of decreasing relevance to the modern social networking
landscape and ethically troublesome regarding the preservation
and publication of personal data. We present and evaluate a
method which provides researchers in identity resolution with
easy access to a realistically-challenging labelled dataset of online
profiles, drawing on four of the currently largest and most influ-
ential online social networks. We validate the comparability of
samples drawn through this method and discuss the implications
of this mechanism for researchers as well as potential alternatives
and extensions.
Index Terms—replication; privacy; identity resolution; social
web mining.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity resolution tasks are a form of classification whereby
two or more profiles of a person – often from different
databases – are matched together based on the similarity of
their features. The aim is to identify multiple profiles referring
to the same individual, where a profile may include everything
from simple biographical attributes to inferred characteristics
such as writing style. The aim of identity resolution is to allow
different sets of information about a person to be connected.
A number of solutions have been proposed specifically for
identity resolution tasks across social networking sites (SNSs),
each making use of some part of the diverse feature set
available in social network profiles [1], [2]. Yet without a
common frame of reference to work against, these various
approaches and results are difficult to compare, which hinders
identification of the best-performing methods and the direction
of future research.
In many machine learning domains, research is advanced by
the sharing of labelled datasets for purposes of replication, val-
idation and incremental improvement on methodology. How-
ever, ethical constraints can prevent the dissemination of such
datasets when they contain significant personal information,
such as is always the case with profile data from SNSs [3].
While this profile data is nominally public information, as
accessible as newspapers, it would be irresponsible to assume
that personal information embedded in a public profile dataset
is safe to preserve forever, and allowing members to later ex-
cise their data would pose significant obstacles to maintenance
and consistency of instances of the dataset. Attempts have
been made to anonymise these resources, but numerous de-
anonymisation attacks have been demonstrated against such
ostensibly anonymised datasets [2], [3], [4].
Rather than provide a single common dataset, we propose a
sampling method which should allow researchers to indepen-
dently gather comparable datasets. We take this approach to
overcome the tension between the research need for replication
and ethical handling of personal information. We propose,
implement, and evaluate a sampling tool for gathering labelled
connections between online instances of profiles, and also
for gathering suitable negative data – real profiles which a
classifier may be realistically asked to discriminate from the
actual linked target. The output of this tool is a labelled dataset
of profiles suitable for training and evaluating systems aimed
at resolving identities across different SNSs.
Providing a tool rather than a dataset allows for comparable
samples of linked profiles to be independently harvested by
researchers from publicly available data on SNSs, without
need for public release of actual profile data snapshots.
Our aim in this publication is to demonstrate that data
collected by different researchers using this tool will be
sufficiently comparable that their methods and results can be
contrasted with some confidence, while at the same time they
are working with data realistically reflecting the current social
networking landscape. This approach also allows individuals
and SNSs to determine between them what information is to be
revealed to the public and does not presume upon any improper
access on the part of researchers acting as part of that public.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we survey
historic and existing sources of ground-truth data as used
in previous studies, identifying issues with these sources. In
Section III, we outline the sampling method we propose along
with some requirements for implementing it. We demonstrate
one such implementation in Section IV, and use two large
samples gathered via this implementation in Section V and VI
to validate that samples drawn through this method are com-
parable. We conclude in Section VII by discussing our results
and some outstanding issues in this area.
II. GROUND-TRUTH DATA SOURCES
In aid of identifying suitable methodology, we survey the
data sources employed in existing literature on identity reso-
lution across social networking sites.
Malhotra et al. [5] in 2012 made use of three separate
sources: Google’s Social Graph API, and two social aggre-
gators, FriendFeed and Profilactic. Of these three sources,
none are still operational. This is a recurring pattern with
social aggregation services similar to FriendFeed. Many exist
or have existed, marketing themselves to users on the basis
of consolidated access to multiple social networks, but they
commonly go out of operation or are bought up by dominant
social media organisations which repurpose their assets. This is
disappointing, because as Malhotra et al. and also Jain et al. [6]
with their small Social Graph API dataset and Irani et al. [7]
with their unnamed single aggregator site all demonstrate,
these sites can be a rich source of ground truth data whilst
they exist.
One of these services, Plaxo [8] (which now operates as
an online address book service, with mostly private profiles),
has released a tool which highlights how user annotation
of links might be utilised by researchers to gather labelled
profile linkage data, relying on rel=‘me’ annotation within
the anchor tags for links as part of a crawler. To make
suitable use of this annotation, researchers would first have
to gather a large random sample of profiles which contain
annotated links. Though they do not explicitly state their
collection method, Buccafurri et. al [9] appear to have made
use of such rel=‘me’ annotations and/or Friend-of-a-Friend
(FOAF) data (see below) in identifying cross-links between
profiles on LiveJournal, Flickr, Twitter and Youtube, a dataset
which was later enriched by Bennacer et. al [10]. In this dataset
of 93,169 nodes, only 462 unique cross-links are identified,
suggesting such annotations are not in widespread adoption.
Golbeck and Rothstein [11] used FOAF semantic data
obtained from a number of social networking sites, looking
for specific shared traits in FOAF files such as chat IDs or
homepages in order to identify profiles of the same person.
The FOAF format – being a common format for description
of profiles and their interconnections – would be theoretically
ideal for gathering linked profiles, if it were widely supported
by large SNSs. However this does not appear to be the case,
with LiveJournal the lone popular exception amongst a largely
niche set of small SNSs which support it.
Goga et al. [12] made use of the Friend Finder functionality
which was formerly common on many social networks, using
an existing list of 10 million email addresses to find users’
accounts present on multiple social media platforms. Due to
several privacy concerns raised by the feature, many social
networks no longer allow email-based search for profiles,
most notably Facebook [13]. Even were the functionality still
available, the email addresses required in order to utilise it to
gather linked profiles are typically more closely guarded than
other profile information.
Narayanan et al. [2] take a somewhat different approach
in their de-anonymisation study, basing their ground-truth
mappings between profiles on exact matches in the username
or name fields, attempting to verify such matches with a score
generated from a small number of heuristics – the length and
rarity of the name, and overlap in location information. As
their method (topographical identification) did not rely on any
of these features, this linkage method retains validity within
their study, but it cannot easily be generalised as a means for
other researchers to go about acquiring ground-truth mappings
for identity resolution.
Based on an exploit discovered by Kaafar et. al [14], some
researchers make use of the optional ‘other profiles’ feature of
Google Buzz profiles to identify cross-links between profiles
from different networks. They gather a large dataset of some
4 million profile identifiers from Buzz, a predecessor of the
Google+ social network, using a graph-based crawler which
collects lists of Follower/Following users from each profile.
A large proportion of these profiles made use of the ‘other
profiles’ feature, and as such this dataset has gone on to be
reused in several other studies on identity resolution across
SNSs [1], [15], [16]. However, Google Buzz was discontinued
in 2011, and its successor Google+ does not make a profile’s
Circles (the Follower/Following relationship being abandoned
with Buzz) easily accessible for scraping.
Based on this survey, it appears that the majority of pre-
viously employed datasets in this area of identity resolution
come from sources which are no longer available for re-
sampling. Those datasets which may theoretically be re-
sampled in the same manner are of limited value, covering
only small user populations.
III. SAMPLING METHOD
If we are to avoid making assumptions based on usernames,
and cannot rely on the availability of unique identifiers persist-
ing across SNSs (such as email addresses), then the search for
ground truth data is effectively a search for instances where a
user has stated a connection between two or more of their own
profiles. Social aggregation services are one means by which
such information may be collected. However, they appear to
be an unpredictable source, not suitable for the basis of long-
term research. If social aggregation services cannot be relied
upon as indexes, then it may be better to examine the social
networks themselves for users’ revelation of connections to
other networks.
This is similar to the approach used in the tool released by
Plaxo [8], which examines the rel=‘me’ property of links
to find links which a user identifies as being another profile
of theirs. This annotation does not appear to be in widespread
adoption, but it may be possible to find alternative indications
that a link is intended to represent another profile of the user.
Presuming for the moment one such SNS where we expect
to find this ground-truth link data, which we will term the
primary study network or primary network, the problems can
be stated as follows:
1) Gathering a representative random sample of profiles
from the primary network. Notably, we are not interested
in identifying the most connected users or in sampling
a connected subgraph of the primary network, only in a
random selection of profiles (or in graph terms, nodes).
Previous efforts focused on crawling large graphs of
SNS users through the application of breadth-first search
or random walks [17] are unable to reach disconnected
components of the overall graph and are usually biased
towards popular nodes by early stopping.
Most desirable would be methods which can directly
sample from the network, such as the ability to ran-
domly select from assigned unique identifiers, but these
indexing mechanisms are usually not publicly available.
As an alternative, we suggest that the network search
functionality provided by many SNSs can be used to
gather unbiased samples of profiles. This functionality
is provided to users to enable them to find other users
based upon their name or other information. Given a
random selection of search attributes (such as can be
constructed based on population data such as census
records), these search systems can provide a random
index into the SNS’s profiles.
2) Identifying in randomly selected profiles those linked
profiles which belong to networks of interest. While
links act as identifiers for a profile, extracting the profile
content is an involved process highly dependent on the
network being targeted. As such, it is prudent to focus
on a few such networks – secondary study networks –
and discard links to other networks.
3) Gathering plausible negative examples for a ‘realistically
challenging’ dataset. A sample consisting of only those
profiles which are known to be matched would be of
little use for training and evaluating a classifier. As
well as positive examples of profiles which should be
matched, an appropriate sample should be made of those
profiles which are not matched in other networks, for
both primary and secondary study networks.
For any profile, it would be possible to use other profiles
in the same network as negative examples, but these pro-
files would make for a poor candidate set, being mostly
easily distinguishable from the true results. Instead, we
opt for a candidate set which more reasonably reflects
real disambiguation tasks with public social network
data – search results in the secondary study network,
with the query being constructed based on attributes
of the primary network profile from which a link was
found. We believe such a dataset better reflects a core
issue of identity resolution: given a particular individual
profile, how do we find out which of many profiles with
the same name are the ones to be connected?
Note that users voluntarily complete these fields in their
profiles, and so as with previously discussed datasets, the
datasets we aim to generate may not be valid for adversarial
profile linkage tasks, where the emphasis is on detecting a
link between a user who is attempting to mask any connection
between their two profiles. Nor should the sampling method
be taken to enumerate all matching profiles in the primary
network, or any similar property which assumes an exhaus-
tive exploration of any of the study networks. The dataset
should remain relevant for purposes such as estimating the
privacy impact of revealing certain profile attributes, testing
existing identity resolution methods and comparing behaviours
between the same individuals on different social networks.
Considering these issues, the requirements for our method
are:
1) A primary study network in which users provide links
which can be understood as statements that the link
refers to another profile of theirs. This network must
have a network search system which can be used for
random sampling of profiles.
2) A set of secondary study networks which are linked to
from the primary network. These networks must have
an index suitable for selecting negative examples.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
One of the most promising data sources as a primary
network for implementing this sampling of ground-truth data
would appear to be Google+. As previously mentioned,
Google+ provides an “other profiles” field on a person’s profile
page where users can provide links to their profiles elsewhere
on the web. This field is accessible via the Google+ API and
so it is possible to automatically examine the Google+ network
to find profiles which link to other profiles of the same person.
There are other reasons to favour the selection of Google+:
while it is difficult to predict the shifting landscape of SNSs,
Google as an organisation seems unlikely to disappear in
the short-term, and it seems reasonably likely to maintain
the Google+ service or an equivalent network for the next
few years. At the same time, a number of influential studies
referenced above have historically made use of a dataset drawn
from Google profiles.
The primary network must also have a search system
which can be used to perform random sampling from the
network. For this, we draw upon the approach of Gonzalez
et. al. [18], whereby a random sample of names from a large
list of uncommon surnames are used as input into Google+’s
profile search API, and those result sets numbering less than
Google+’s cap on responses are taken as an unbiased sample of
profiles. The aim of using uncommon surnames is to increase
the likelihood of retrieving result sets numbering less than the
results cap. Because the Google+ search API limits the number
of returned profiles to a maximum of 300 per query1, and these
results are ordered by popularity, a sample which includes all
search results would be biased towards more popular users.
Therefore, we accept only those profiles returned by queries
which have fewer than 300 results in total.
In detail, our method proceeds as follows.
1) Initial search terms are randomly selected from a list of
128,000 uncommon US surnames. Following Gonzalez
et al. [18] this list was drawn from those surnames which
1At the time of publication for Gonzalez et al.[18], this limit was 1000
occurred more than 100 times and less than 1000 times
in the US Census 20002.
2) The Google+ search API is queried for these terms.
Those result sets with < 300 items are taken as unbiased.
3) The search phase completed, all publicly available data
on the accepted profiles is downloaded via the Google+
API. Two formats are used to store the data – one which
records the exact queries and the raw responses, and
another which standardises the data into a Profile object.
4) The ‘other profiles’ sections of the Google+ profiles
gathered are examined to establish the ground-truth true
links. Where a link is made to one of our secondary
networks, that link is queued for download and a record
is made of the connection between the two profiles.
5) The full name attributes of the Google+ profiles are then
gathered to create a second set of search terms.
6) This second search term list is then entered into the
search functionality for each of the secondary networks,
and the resulting profiles are queued for later down-
load. These results form the realistic candidate set for
attempted identity resolution from the seed profile.
7) The profiles indicated by the true links and the candidate
sets from the name-based searches are then downloaded
from their respective networks’ APIs, and stored in the
same manner as the Google+ profiles.
There are a few implications of this method which should be
borne in mind. Firstly, surnames of profiles will be unusually
distinctive as compared with a population average, though the
procedure for selection of negative results given above should
mitigate this impact. Secondly, these names are those which
are uncommon in the United States. As previously addressed
by Gonzalez et al, the diverse immigrant history of the United
States combined with the US bias in Google+ membership
would mitigate the US-centric aspect of this concern, but there
are possible correlates of low-incidence surnames with recent
immigration and thus socio-economic status and perhaps in
turn lower digital literacy. Next, it should be noted that the
sample mechanism used has only 128,000 different search
possibilities, with a proportional chance of collision, and also
a maximum theoretical result size of 38,272,000 Google+
profiles (though in practice there are likely to be far fewer
than this). Finally, there will be at most 299 Google+ profiles
with the same name, so for a method attempting specifically
to discriminate between such profiles, its capability cannot be
demonstrated as greater than this limit.
A. Secondary Study Networks
We are interested in selecting only nodes from a specific
set of SNSs we term the secondary study networks. Extract-
ing structured information from profile pages involves API
queries for the content of profile pages identified by URLs,
analysis of which must be specific to the social network in
question. Additionally, name-based search functionality must
be implemented for each social network being sampled, in
2Data on surnames occurring less than 100 times was not available















TABLE I: Most commonly linked profile networks.
order to furnish negative examples. We are therefore interested
in finding the right social networking sites to form the initial
set of study networks from which to draw our samples.
A number of constraints exist, including that the network
in question must make profiles public (to members of the
network, if not the wider internet) and allow for name-based
search. The main deciding factor for including a network
will be whether a significant number of Google+ profiles
link to profiles in the network, as this furnishes researchers
with a greater number of positive examples to analyse, and
focuses efforts on linkage tasks likely to be of more value in
application scenarios. Our method could easily be extended
to include less-frequently-linked networks, though researchers
may need to select larger initial samples from Google+ to
get representative sets of linked profiles. Using our proposed
sampling procedure for Google+ profiles and examining those
profiles with links to other networks, we counted the number
of links to other networks.
As shown in Table I, the most common networks which
were not other services owned by Google (which we might
expect to be overrepresented, and are increasingly integrated
into Google+) were Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. These
top three networks would appear to be mostly suitable as
secondary networks, with some minor caveats regarding their
accessibility: for example, LinkedIn does not offer a global
name-based search feature within its ordinary public API, but
this functionality can be obtained through web-scraping calls.
V. EVALUATION
Our primary evaluation of the sampling method is to com-
pare the distribution of certain node attributes in different
samples gathered by our implementation. The node attributes
that are the simplest to compare in this manner are numerical,
so we examine the distribution of certain numeric properties
of nodes – such as counts of followers and posts – in dif-
ferent samples gathered from the Google+ and Twitter profile
networks via our initial sampling method.
Using the methodology described above, we gathered two
large independent samples from both the Google+ and Twitter
networks. The two samples of the Google+ network had
respective sizes of 4,986 and 11,719 nodes, while the samples
of the Twitter network had 8,259 and 17,862 nodes. These
samples (henceforth Datasets 1 & 2) were gathered over
Oct-Nov 2015 and Dec-Jan 2016 respectively. A number
of numeric properties were recorded reflecting attributes of
interest to identity resolution research.
We could attempt to demonstrate a lack of statistically
significant differences between these samples by aiming to fail
a statistical test such as the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. However, the large sample sizes mean that a direct test
for statistically significant differences between the two samples
would likely be overpowered for the usual critical values, with
a high chance of committing a Type I error and finding a false
difference between the groups.
Rather than focusing on statistical significance, we can test
whether there are important differences between the samples
by comparing the effect sizes between the two samples.
Table II shows comparisons between counts of attributes for
each node. Cohen’s d is the typical measure of effect size, but
its calculation relies on assumptions of normality which are
violated in social network data, which tends to follow power-
law distributions. We instead use a nonparametric measure of
effect size known as Cliff’s δ which has been recommended
for such situations [19].
Other properties of the two samples may impact their
comparability for research purposes. We can more directly
examine this by reference to the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
also known as information gain when using one sample in
order to approximate the other. This measure directly relates
to our intended use of the sampling mechanism – as a means
for researchers to compare results obtained on one sample
with existing results obtained on a similarly collected sample.
Table II reports the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between
the two samples, with measures discretised into 15 bins
for computation3. As the KL divergence is non-symmetrical
between distributions, the figures reported are the average of
both directions of the measure.
Property G+ |δ| Tw |δ| G+ KL Tw KL
Age∗ <0.01 – 0.01 –
NumFollowers 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00
NumFollowing – 0.03 – 0.00
NumInteracted 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01
NumLocations <0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
NumTexts 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01
NumDescribes 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02
NumLinks 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04
NumPics <0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
NumTimes 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.01
TABLE II: Nonparametric effect sizes and average KL-
divergence for comparison of samples from the Google+ and
Twitter networks. ∗Age where available.
The KL results show that very little divergence is present
between the two samples, or, alternately, that very little in-
formation is lost when using one to approximate the other.
Similarly, The average of all δ for Google+ comparisons is
<0.03 and for Twitter is <0.04, indicating a very low practical
3Based on Sturge’s formula, k = dlog2n+ 1e
difference overall between properties in the two samples. The
large sample size makes us confident that we are not failing
to detect larger effects.
VI. APPLICATION OF EXISTING IDENTITY RESOLUTION
APPROACH
As a secondary evaluation of our proposed approach, we
apply an existing identity resolution method to both of our
datasets. This serves to illustrate a possible use of these
samples and further validates the comparability of results
drawn from different samples. The aim here is not to provide
a novel and competitive classifier, but to demonstrate the
viability of our suggested replication method.
Following Goga et al. [1], we investigated the three features
they used for identity resolution: the name, location and profile
image of each pair of profiles.
A. Username
Usernames have often been considered a useful feature in
identity resolution. Perito et al. [15] provide a full treatment
of this topic. However, facets of our sampling method make
names unlikely to be effective features: the ‘display name’
feature was used to generate the negative examples, so all
comparisons are between profiles with highly similar names.
The effect is that names are not highly discriminative
features in the comparisons made in our datasets, as shown in
Figure 1a. In fact, the average Levenshtein distance between
matched pairs of profiles was actually greater than the distance
between unmatched pairs (5.82 and 4.01 for matched vs 2.75
and 3.24 for unmatched). This is the reverse of the normally
expected direction in broader comparisons.
B. Image
We use a perceptual hashing technique to identify the key
features of all profile images, and then calculate the Hamming
distance between these two hashes [20], to test for superficial
adjustments to the same avatar image. This feature showed
some small but consistent discrimination, with the average
Hamming distance between matched pairs being 27.72 and
27.02 for Datasets 1 and 2 respectively, and 31.66 and 31.94
between unmatched pairs. Just as Goga et al. discovered,
simple threshold-based classification using this image feature
has poor recall, but high precision – not many users do use the
same profile image, but when they do they are very likely to
be the same person. As Figure 1b shows, this means this type
of image similarity performs poorly as a classifier by itself.
C. Location
Location data such as geolocated status updates or persistent
‘hometown’ or ‘location’ fields can be a good feature when it
is available. However, location data is quite rare in our dataset,
and this rarity is compounded by location comparisons only
being possible where both profiles have location data: only 72
of 9558 comparisons in Dataset 2 and 17 of 1309 comparisons
in Dataset 1 could use geodesic distance as a feature.
As Figure 1c shows, however, within this small subset,
location distance was highly predictive.
(a) Name-based classification (b) Image-based classification (c) Location-based classification
Fig. 1: ROC plots for individual feature classifiers
D. Combined
We investigated the identifiability of these features jointly
as part of a binary logistic regression classifier combining all
three features, using a ten-fold cross-validation approach.
An important issue for classification tasks such as this is the
handling of missing data. The majority of comparisons lack
a location distance component, so how we handle this has
a significant impact on model performance. Naively omitting
records with missing data produces good-looking performance,
as shown in Figure 2a, but tells us little about performance
for the majority of cases. Imputing missing data with feature
averages produces a more muted performance across more
examples, shown in Figure 2b.
Performance in general was quite poor where location
information was not available, unlike the findings of Goga et
al. [1]. We can attribute this largely to the differences in the
discriminative ability of the username feature, as this has poor
performance within our dataset due to the manner in which
negative examples are gathered and comparisons are made.
Our aim was not to provide a competitive identity resolution
approach, but to demonstrate the comparability of results
obtained through different samples via our methodology. We
can see from the ROC plots that this is validated, with curves
following the same trajectories with only minor deviations.
Dataset 2 does tend to produce marginally better performance,
but this is due to training benefiting from a larger sample size.
Randomly subsampling 1000 data points from both samples
produces a much closer match, as illustrated in Figure 2c.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Implications for identity resolution research
We have presented a sampling mechanism for gathering
ground-truth links between profile networks and appropriate
negative examples, in proportion to their appearance in real-
world data. Our evaluations confirm that samples being drawn
in this manner are sufficiently comparable that methods de-
veloped against one sample should transfer to other samples
drawn in the same manner with minimal impact – based on
this initial analysis we should expect even small effect sizes
to be replicated between experiments performed on different
samples. We can also expect that ROC curves from a method
trialled on one dataset to closely track those from another.
A common reference point for experimentation is necessary
for researchers to compare their methodologies, and sampling
mechanisms which reflect their population are necessary for
properly grounding results. Both comparison and reference to
the true population are necessary for advancing the state of
the art. It is our hope that our sampling method will be used
by researchers in identity resolution as a basis for reproducing
each others’ results and comparing identity resolution systems
which make use of the heterogeneous data available in SNS
profiles, something which has been hindered by the difficulties
in obtaining and sharing such privacy-sensitive data.
The implementation we present focuses on the Google+
profile network as its primary network. However, our method
is not restricted to application on just this network. Any SNS
which provides a similar field to the ‘other profiles’ field
within Google+ and makes this field publicly accessible would
prove a suitable replacement. Indeed, recent work in identity
resolution has started to recognise the identification use of
URLs included in Twitter profiles [21]. While this field is less
well-designated than the ‘other profiles’ field on Google+, and
its utility as a source of ground truth must be investigated,
it would provisionally appear to be a candidate replacement
for the Google+ ‘other profiles’ attribute which would allow
samples to be drawn with Twitter as the primary network.
Similarly, the implementation we present suggests that
blocking – the generation of candidate record pairs for identity
resolution – be based on the name of one or more profiles,
as this is the search mechanism used for collecting negative
examples. This is not necessarily problematic, as name fields
are often used as blocking keys, but we note that alternative
search systems can be used for finding candidate profiles,
including searches based on content and network properties as
described by Jain et al. [6]. Generally speaking, any property
which can be used to generate negative examples from search
(a) Omitting records with missing features (b) Missing features replaced with means (c) Subsampling 1000 of each dataset
Fig. 2: ROC plots for combined classifiers
of secondary study networks can also be used for blocking.
This may be particularly important when considering the
performance of classifiers which include profile name similar-
ity as a key feature, as sampling negative results based on name
necessarily reduces its utility as a distinguishing feature. Such
a task, however, realistically reflects real-world challenges in
disambiguating users with the same or similar names.
Finally, we note that while our approach is particularly
tailored to research for identifying links between profiles
on SNSs, the generation of accurate ground-truth data is a
recognised problem for identity resolution in general [22], and
it is possible that this sampling approach could be informative
for researchers working within similar constraints, such as in
bibliographical or medical record linkage.
B. Limitations of the tool
We have realised our implementation in a Python tool
capable of sampling ground truth data from the primary and
secondary networks given in this paper. The potential for one
or more SNSs to alter or close their public API is a partial
threat to continued functionality of our sampling tool. While
the tool has been designed in a modular manner, so that
secondary study network APIs which no longer work need not
impair the general operation of the tool, it is likely that main-
tenance will be necessary to keep these modules functional.
Policy changes on the part of the SNS may similarly affect
the data this tool is able to provide to researchers. We note
also potential improvements in the speed and reliability of the
tool which could be achieved through sustained development.
In this work we have concentrated on development of a
sampling tool which uses the APIs provided by the SNSs,
using only the access rights granted to any app developer.
This is ethically necessary: our position as members of the
public ensures we do not gain improper access to the profile
content of users by e.g. befriending them, or paying for profile
information as an advertiser. Authentication with the SNS
means their release of the data being sampled is tracked and
recorded. However, use of the APIs for these services can be
limiting – in some cases, content which a member of the public
may view on the web is not available within the API.
A possible solution to these limits would be to apply
web-scraping technology to enrich profile data. This would
bypass many hurdles with API limitations. However, this
is not a straightforward proposition: modern SNSs make
extensive use of asynchronously-loaded content, with little
profile information accessible at the initial page load. Scraping
technology has advanced in step, but a scraper intent on
accessing large numbers of profiles may also have to contend
with accounts and IP addresses being blacklisted, necessitating
greater infrastructural requirements – such as a cooperating
network of machines – for any sampling tool, which would
hinder replication. Overcoming these issues may require cen-
tralisation of the sampling tool as a service for researchers,
which re-opens questions about sharing profile data.
C. Privacy & Ethics
The issue underlying the design of this sampling mechanism
can be described as an ethical tension. It is easy for scientists
to identify that making their results replicable is ethically
necessary, this having long been a guiding principle of science.
A direct approach to satisfying this replication requirement
would be to release all the data used in an experiment, and in
most areas this is still appropriate. At the same time, however,
there is an increasing recognition of the paramount ethical
obligations to protect the privacy of data subjects [23]. Even
where, as in psychology or the social sciences, waivers can be
be gathered to permit the release of some personal information,
only relevant data is collected and communicated, to reduce
the risk of a subject being identified. In large-scale studies
of social networks, contacting profile owners for approval
would be impractical, and in the field of identity resolution
in particular it is not sensible to talk of removing personally
identifiable information from a data release (except perhaps
as a research challenge). Researchers are presented with a
difficult choice: either they never release their data, protecting
their subjects but hindering the development of their field,
or else release it, and risk harm to their many subjects and
perhaps also personal legal consequences.
Our contribution here has been to identify a means for
researchers in identity resolution – and related fields – to
fulfil their ethical duties to their profession and colleagues
without revealing the personal information of their subjects,
drawing upon the reachability of a common population for
sampling purposes. However, our approach cannot be said to
entirely remove the underlying tension. For one, researchers
must remain cautious about how they store and present data
from these samples. For another, the scraping countermeasures
discussed above require a careful response: the decreasing
availability of useful ground truth data about the identities of
social media users may be a barrier for research in this field,
but it could also be more positively viewed as an indication
that social networking sites are becoming more protective of
their users’ privacy.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have identified a troublesome area for research into
identity resolution, and proposed and validated a solution
based on rigorous sampling from a commonly accessible
population. This solution allows researchers in identity reso-
lution to replicate results and compare methodologies. Future
work in this area might focus on improving this approach
by finding other practical search methods to use for random
sampling, such as content or network-based search. Identifying
a suitable primary network which allows more rapid collection
and iteration over profiles would also be of benefit, improving
the collection rate. Further-reaching improvements might be to
identify alternative mechanisms for researchers to index social
networks, perhaps by negotiating with SNSs for privileged
access for sampling purposes, or by funding and building a
social aggregation service specifically as a research resource.
Further goals for addressing reproducibility in identity reso-
lution research should include the organisation of competitive
events to spur development and comparison of new methods
– itself necessitating a standard evaluation framework such as
that provided by Ko¨pcke et al. [22] – or else focus on a means
of describing and sharing the data transformations necessary
to take raw profile data such as that provided by our tool and
create the data format used in classification.
Our implementation of the sampling mechanism using
Google+ as a primary network is available online at http://
www.github.com/Betawolf/identity-sampler, distributed under
the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial Sharealike
4.0 International Public License. This work is partly supported
by EPSRC grant EP/N028112/1.
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